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STATUTES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) 1 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 
1. Rules 3 and 4 1 
v 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal based on 
Article VIII of the Constitution of the State of Utah; Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) ; and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. WHETHER PICKETT SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Standard of Review: Issue I presents a question of law 
which is reviewed for correctness. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 
P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). 
II. WHETHER, BASED ON THE RECORD BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, IT 
WAS ERROR TO EXTEND THE HOLDING IN PICKETT TO THE PRESENT 
CASE. 
Standard of Review: Issue II presents a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. Saunders v. Sharp, 801 
P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This action was brought in the Eighth Judicial District 
Court by Broadbent Land Company ("Broadbent" and "Appellant") 
against the Town of Manila and Daggett County ("the Town", 
"the County" sometimes collectively referred to as 
"defendants" or "respondents") for trespass and the taking of 
property without just compensation as a result of the Town and 
County's joint actions in installing a sewage line or trunk 
line along a road on Broadbentfs property. Neither the Town 
nor the County instituted condemnation proceedings or sought 
permission from Broadbent to install the trunk line on 
Broadbent1s property. 
The Town and the County moved for summary judgment that 
the road in question was a public road and that the Town was 
not required to obtain an easement from Broadbent for 
construction of the trunk line along the road. The Town and 
County relied on the case of Pickett v. California Pacific 
Utilities, 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980), which held that 
construction and maintenance of an overhead powerline, within 
the boundaries of a public highway, are consistent with the 
permissible uses to be made of a public highway easement and 
do not constitute an additional burden or servitude. Id. at 
2 
327. The Motion for Summary Judgment was decided based on 
memoranda filed by the parties. The Eighth Judicial District 
Court on April 26, 1991, Honorable Judge Dennis L. Draney, 
issued a ruling granting the Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment which disposed of all issues. Broadbent filed a 
Notice of Appeal on June 6, 1991 with the office of the clerk 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW, 
JL. The Town of Manila constructed a new sewage system 
in Daggett County, Utah. (R. at 48). 
2. The lagoons for that system are located on real 
property owned by Broadbent. The Town of Manila brought 
condemnation proceedings to obtain that property. The 
condemnation action is Manila v. Broadbent Land Company, Civil 
No. CV 306B (on appeal Case No. 900007). (R. at 48). 
3. Subsequently, the Daggett County Commission executed 
a "grant of easement to lay and operate sewer lines" (the 
"Easement Agreement") in favor of the Town of Manila to 
construct a trunk line along the alleged county road on 
property owned by Broadbent. (R. at 48). 
3 
4. The Town of Manila did not obtain an easement or 
other permission from Broadbent, nor did the Town of Manila 
institute condemnation proceedings against Broadbent in 
connection with construction of the trunk line. (R. at 49). 
5. This action was brought by Broadbent seeking damages 
for trespass and the taking of property without just 
compensation against the Town of Manila and the County of 
Daggett. Following the filing of Broadbentfs Complaint and 
limited discovery by the parties, the defendants, the Town of 
Manila and the County of Daggett, filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. at 44). 
6. The defendants argued on summary judgment that the 
road is a public road and that the Town of Manila was not 
required to obtain an easement from Broadbent for construction 
of the trunk line along the road on Broadbentfs property. The 
defendants relied on the case of Pickett v. California Pacific 
Utilities, 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980), which held that 
construction and maintenance of an overhead powerline, within 
the boundaries of a public highway, are consistent with the 
permissible uses to be made of a public highway easement and 
do not constitute an additional burden or servitude. Id. at 
327. (R. at 50-51). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. PICKETT SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
Based on the strong dissenting opinion in Pickett and the 
majority opinion adopting a view which was "shared by a 
handful of jurisdictions only" the Pickett opinion should be 
reversed. The better reasoned cases hold that the erection of 
powerlines on a public highway, where the fee title is in the 
owner of abutting property, imposes an additional servitude 
for which the abutting land owner is entitled to compensation. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXPANDING PICKETT BEYOND 
ITS ORIGINAL HOLDING AND APPLYING PICKETT TO THE PRESENT 
CASE. 
Because of the important rights of land owners, the 
Pickett opinion should be confined to its original holding 
which applied to installation of overhead powerlines. Pickett 
should not be applied to the present case which involves 
installation of underground sewage lines. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. PICKETT SHOULD BE REVERSED• 
Defendant's case is premised on the holding in Pickett v. 
California Pacific Utilities, 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980)(Hall, 
J. dissenting). The Pickett case was a 3:2 opinion. Justices 
Maughan, Crockett and Wilkins filed the majority opinion. The 
dissenting opinion was prepared by Justice Hall and was joined 
by Justice Stewart. Justice Hallfs dissenting opinion stated 
that in Pickett, the majority of the Supreme Court had adopted 
a view which was "shared by a handful of jurisdictions only." 
Pickett, 619 P.2d at 328 (Hall, J. dissenting). Justice Hall 
further stated that there were five tests1 used in the 
jurisdictions around the country and that under all but one of 
the five tests, 
the placement of defendants1 utility lines on the 
roadway in question constitute an additional 
servitude upon the easement held by the public 
therein. The roadway lies in a rural section of 
Iron County. The purpose of the lines bears no 
relationship to the use of the roadway itself. 
Under such circumstances, the vague test applied by 
the main opinion, employing concepts of the 
advancement of civilization, and proper and 
consistent uses of highways in light of human 
1
 A thorough discussion of the five tests used is 
found in Annotation, Additional Servitude - Electric Line, 58 
A.L.R.2d 526 (1958). (Plaintiff has updated the survey of the 
various jurisdictions since the A.L.R. was written. A summary 
of the A.L.R. with the updated survey is attached hereto as 
"Exhibit A"). 
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progress, seems severely to compromise the rights 
of landowners willing to provide gratuitously for 
vehicular traffic over their property. Any private 
roadway dedicated for use as a public thoroughfare 
thus becomes a pathway for whatever use a county 
authority, in its sole discretion, deems fit to 
impose, regardless of the detriment to adjacent 
landowners. Little imagination is required to 
summon up possible uses which would be severely 
detrimental, if not completely destructive, of 
surrounding farmland; uses which, according to the 
majority view, could be imposed without the 
necessity of any compensation whatsoever. 
Pickett, 619 P.2d at 328 (Hall, J. dissenting). 
Defendants have relied on a Montana case, Bolincrer v. 
City of Bozeman. 493 P.2d 1062 (1972), as standing for the 
proposition that construction of a sewage line in a public 
right-of-way is consistent with the public use of a road and 
does not create an additional burden on the servient estate. 
However, Justice Hall's dissenting opinion cites the following 
better reasoned cases which reject the view espoused in 
Bozeman. Pickett, 619 P.2d at 328, n. 3-6. Donalson v. 
Georgia Power & Light Company, 165 S.E. 440 (Georgia 1932) 
(dedication of land for street purposes held not to authorize 
municipality to allow power company to erect transmission line 
on dedicated land); Callen v. Columbus Edison Electric Light 
Company, 64 N.E. 141 (Ohio 1902) (mandatory injunction ordered 
requiring removal of poles and wires placed by private 
lighting company on street abutting private land owners 
property said placement being deemed an unauthorized taking); 
Kosloskv v. Texas Electric Service Co., 213 S.W. 2d 853 (Texas 
7 
Ct. App. 1948) (County Commissioner's Court had no power to 
issue a franchise attempting to authorize electric company to 
construct electric lines along a public road, electric company 
must condemn the right-of-way to construct said electric line 
or obtain consent of land owner); and Cathev v. Arkansas Power 
& Light Co. , 97 S.W. 2d 624 (Arkansas 1936) (when land is 
condemned for right-of-way or easement of any kind, the land 
owner still owns the land subject only to the easement 
granted, therefore appellee, having erected poles and wires on 
appellants land was a trespasser and liable for compensation 
to the owner of the land). 
The Town and County entered into the Easement Agreement 
in an attempt to circumvent the legal requirements of 
condemning Broadbent's property and compensating him for it. 
Defendants simply took Broadbentfs property without any 
compensation. 
These actions by the Town and County are even more 
outrageous when considered in light of the fact that the 
purported easement over the road which crosses Broadbent1s 
property was obtained by prescriptive use. No title document 
was ever filed on the easement; no condemnation action was 
ever brought on the road, and no compensation was ever 
provided to Broadbent. Furthermore, the only use made during 
the prescriptive period was for limited surface road purposes. 
8 
There has never been any subsurface use whatsoever, let alone 
any sewer related use. 
The road in the present case, is like the road discussed 
in the Pickett opinion. There the road in question was 
dedicated to the public use, "not by an expressed assertion of 
intent on the part of adjacent land owners," but by 
prescriptive use. Pickett, 619 P.2d at 329 (Hall, J. 
dissenting). Justice Hall stated with respect to the easement 
so acquired that, 
[T]he extent of an easement acquired by 
prescription is measured and limited by the use 
made during the prescriptive period . . . [W]hile 
the owner of the dominant estate may enjoy to the 
fullest extent the rights conferred by his 
easement, he may not alter its character so as to 
further burden or increase the restriction upon the 
servient estate. 
Pickett, 619 P.2d 329 (quoting McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 
996 (Utah 1978)). See also Wood v. Ashbv, 253 P.351, 354 
(Utah 1952) (increased burden upon servient estate will 
extinguish right to easement); and Wright v. Horse Creek 
Ranches, 697 P. 2d 384, 388-89 (Colo. 1985) (beneficiary of 
easement by prescription may not change use so as to impose 
additional and nonconsensual burdens upon servient estate). 
Justice Hall continued, stating that, 
It would be inexplicably inconsistent to state, 
that where presumptive rights are obtained in the 
form of a regular easement, the owner of the 
dominant estate is bound by the use which has 
established the easement, while, where prescriptive 
rights are established by statutory implied 
dedication, the owner of the dominant estate is 
9 
confined only to the uses consistent with the 
progress of civilization. 
For the foregoing reasons, I would rule that 
the placement of utility lines along the roadway in 
question constitutes an additional servitude, not 
comprehended within the estate held by the county 
on behalf of the public at the time of its 
attempted grant of a franchise to defendant Cal-
Pac. As such, the attempted franchise grant was 
void, and the presence of the utility lines on 
plaintiff's property entitles him to relief. 
Pickett, 619 P.2d at 329 (Hall, J. dissenting). Broadbent is 
entitled to the relief urged by Justice Hall in his dissent in 
Pickett. 
The holding in Pickett encourages circumvention of 
condemnation by expansion of easements. It ignores the rights 
of property owners completely. The power of eminent domain 
was established to allow public use of private land through 
compensation to the landowner. Now, Pickett deprives the 
landowner of that compensation. In fact the Pickett case was 
relied on by the Town of Manila and Daggett County in the 
actions taken by them in the present case. Pickett sends a 
clear message that easements may be expanded indefinitely and 
that increasing the burden on the servient estate is 
acceptable without any compensation to the servient owner. 
Pickett should be overruled. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXPANDING PICKETT BEYOND 
ITS ORIGINAL HOLDING AND, APPLYING PICKETT TO THE 
PRESENT CASE, 
In the alternative to overruling Pickett, this Court 
should reverse the trial court's extension of Pickett to the 
present case. The defendants argue that the issue in this 
case was directly confronted by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Pickett. The precise issue in Pickett was whether the 
erection of electric power lines on a public highway, the fee 
to which was in the owner of the abutting property, was within 
the scope of an easement for highway purposes or imposed an 
additional servitude for which the abutting owner was entitled 
to compensation, Pickett, involved the erection of overhead 
power poles, not underground sewage lines. There is no 
precedent in Utah involving underground sewage lines beneath 
the road. 
The defendants also have relied on Bentle v. County of 
Bannock. 656 P.2d 1383 (Idaho 1983), which cited Pickett and 
ruled that construction of a sewer line along a public right-
of-way was a public use which was incident to the use for 
which public streets were laid out. The Bentle case was a 
very different case from the present case. In Bentle, prior 
to the time the sewage lines were installed, subsurface gas 
lines within parts of the right-of-way, underground telephone 
cables, and a waste water transmission line had been 
11 
installed. These previous lines were installed without 
objection by the plaintiffs. Bentle, 656 P.2d at 1385. 
In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court cited to Idaho 
statutes specifically allowing for installment of utility 
lines on or under a public road. The court stated, 
[I]t is clear that, in Idaho, all public roads, 
including those created by prescription, are 
subject to the right of utilities to place utility 
transmission facilities on or under the road area. 
IC. § 62-701 provides in part: 
"Telegraph and telephone corporations may construct 
lines of telegraph or telephone along and upon any 
public road or highway . . . ." (Emphasis added). 
I.e. § 62-1101 provides in pertinent part: "Any 
[gas company] shall have . . . the right to 
construct, maintain, and operate [a] pipeline upon, 
along, or over, or under, any and all, public 
roads, streets and highways . . . ." (Emphasis 
added). Since all public road easements, including 
those acquired by prescription are subject to the 
statutory right to install these utility services, 
the installation of a sewage disposal pipeline 
within an existing roadway easement does not, as a 
practical matter, involve an expansion of the 
easement or an increased burden on the servient 
estate. In fact, as noted above, several 
underground utilities already exist within the very 
easement at issue in this case. 
Bentle, 656 P.2d at 1387 (emphasis added). Clearly, Bentle is 
not at all on point. First, it relied on Idaho statutes 
specifically allowing installation of the utility lines. 
Second, Idaho statutes and the Idaho cases are clearly not 
controlling in this jurisdiction. 
Because of the strong dissent in Pickett and because of 
the important rights of landowners, the trial court should not 
12 
have expanded Pickett beyond its original holding• Pickett 
did not cover the installation of underground sewage lines and 
should not be construed to grant that authority• 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Pickett should be 
overruled. Alternatively, this Court should reverse the trial 
court's extension of Pickett to the present case, as that case 
is distinguishable from the present case. Property rights 
should not be regarded lightly, therefore, Pickett must be 
confined to its original holding as applied to powerlines 
only. The case should then be remanded with instructions for 
a trial on damages which have accrued to Broadbent for inverse 
condemnation and for trespass. 
DATED this Q\3 day of September, 1991. 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Lewis T. Stevens 
Kristin G. Brewer 
(J 11 AIM* \m 
Attorneys for plaint iff-appellant, 




The A.L.R. article referenced in footnote 1, supra, 
discusses the five views mentioned by Justice Stewart in his 
Pickett dissent. It appears that even now the view adopted by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Pickett is the minority position. 
This can be best demonstrated by looking at the views set 
forth in the A.L.R. article and the cases which adopted those 
views at that time and adding what the various jurisdictions 
have done since that time. This is outlined below. 
View 1; Electric power lines of any sort fall within 
the scope of a street or highway easement (transmission along 
a road is not fundamentally different from travel thereon). 
This is the view adopted by Pickett and the A.L.R. article 
originally assigned that view to the following jurisdictions: 
ALABAMA; INDIANA (recent case reaffirms Indiana's position in 
Deetz v. Northern Indiana Fuel and Light, 545 N.E.2d 1103 
(Ind. App. 3 Dist. 1989)(gas pipeline in right-of-way 
permissible use requiring no compensation); KANSAS; KENTUCKY; 
MASSACHUSETTS; OKLAHOMA; SOUTH CAROLINA; WASHINGTON; and WEST 
VIRGINIA. Since the A.L.R. article was written other 
jurisdictions adopting this position are: NEW HAMPSHIRE in 
King v. Town of Lvme. 490 A.2d 1369 (1985)(utilities of all 
kinds can be run on right-of-way over landowners property 
without payment); MONTANA in Bolinger v. City of Bozeman, 493 
vi 
P. 2d 1062 (1972)(municipal sewer may be installed with 
permission of county and without consent of adjoining property 
owners); NEW MEXICO in Amerada Hess Corp. v. Adee, 744 P.2d 
550 (1987)(based on statute, court held that State Highway 
Commission can allow installation of pipelines under highway) ; 
ALASKA in Fisher v. Golden Valley Electric Association, Inc. , 
658 P.2d 127 (1983) (adopts rule permitting powerline 
construction as an incidental and subordinate use of highway 
easement); MICHIGAN in Eyede Brothers v. Eaton County Drain, 
398 N.W.2d 297 (1986)(county can allow construction of sewer 
within easement on highway without fee owners consent); and 
IDAHO in Bentle v. County of Bannock, 656 P.2d 1383 
(1983)(relying on statutory authority, court held that 
county's easement in county road included right to install 
subsurface pipelines for wastewater transmission). 
View 2; Electric powerlines impose no addition 
servitude on lands of abutting owners only where lines have a 
direct relationship to travel in the street or highway 
(example: powerlines for lighting the street or storm drains 
for draining water off the street). The cases originally 
cited in the A.L.R. adopting this position were CALIFORNIA; 
ILLINOIS; IOWA; MARYLAND (see additional case not cited in 
A.L.R. article, Frederick Gas Company v. Abrahams, 286 A.2d 
766 (1972)(Gas Company had no right to install natural gas 
transmissions pipeline in an unpaved county road without 
compensating owner of property which abutted road); MICHIGAN 
v n 
(Note: more recent case cited under View 1 above, Eyede 
Brothers v. Eaton County Drain); MISSISSIPPI; NEW JERSEY; NEW 
YORK; RHODE ISLAND; TENNESSEE and WISCONSIN, In these 
jurisdictions, use of powerlines in streets and highways for 
mixed travel and non-travel purposes is generally held to 
result in the imposition of an additional servitude• 
View 3: Public easement in urban street considerably 
more inclusive than a similar easement in a rural highway. 
Additional servitude is imposed if lines are erected in a 
rural highway. The jurisdictions originally adopting this 
position cited in the A.L.R. article are ARKANSAS and 
PENNSYLVANIA. However, Pennsylvania later rejects this 
distinction beetween rural and urban areas in Miller v. 
Nichols, 526 A.2d 794 (1987). Arkansas has continued the 
urban/rural distinction. See Millsap v. United Tel. Co. of 
Arkansas. 482 S.W.2d 813 (1972)(follows rural urban 
distinction but since powerlines were installed in urban area 
no compensation was required). As noted in the A.L.R. 
article, there has been a gradual diminution of the weight 
given to the location factor. 
View 4: Combination of function of lines and location-
of-way criteria. Electric powerlines must, if imposition of 
additional servitude is to be avoided, be erected in urban 
areas and have as their function (although not necessarily 
their exclusive function) the furnishing of power for a 
purpose directly relating to travel on the streets and 
viii 
highways. The jurisdictions originally adopting this view 
were OHIO and MONTANA, however, the Bozeman case cited under 
View 1 above shows that Montana has moved away from using 
location as criteria. 
View 5: Electric powerlines are deemed to be, by their 
nature, outside the scope of uses which are proper under a 
street or highway easement, such uses being limited to actual 
travel. The jurisdictions originally adopting this view cited 
in the A.L.R. article were GEORGIA (see recent case, 
Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority v. Datryf 220 
S.E.2d 905 (1975)(transit station placed additional servitude 
on plaintiff's property and therefore construction was 
enjoined until compensation paid); LOUISIANA (see recent case 
Gros v. St. Martin Parish Sewerage, 569 So.2d 1085 
(1990)(cannot install sewerlines on property without owners 
permission, sewerlines are beyond the scope of permitted uses 
and constitute a trespass); NEBRASKA; NORTH CAROLINA; and 
TEXAS. CONNECTICUT also appears to adopt this view, although 
the case on point involved a private, not public right-of-way. 
See Kuras v. Kope, 533 A.2d 1202 (1987)(easement owners were 
not entitled to install underground utility lines for electric 
and telephone service in private right-of-way created by 
prescription for purpose of access, there being no evidence 
that this was a foreseeable use on the right-of-way). 
ix 
Pickett adopted the view (view 1) shared by 15 states: 
Alabama, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Washington, West Virginia, New Hampshire, 
Montana, New Mexico, Alaska, Michigan, and Idaho• This 
remains a minority position as 18 other states adopt views 1 
through 4 and would require that compensation be paid to 
Broadbent as the sewage lines are an additional servitude. 
Those 18 states are: California, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, 
Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, 
Wisconsin, Arkansas, Ohio, Georgia, Louisiana, Nebraska, North 
Carolina, Texas, and Connecticut. 
x 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAGGETT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BROADBENT LAND COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE TOWN OF MANILA AND 
DAGGETT COUNTY, 
Defendants. 
R U L I N G 
: a s e No . CV-324B 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Carol 
Scott and Dick Bennett is denied. The court finds that the 
affidavits are based upon personal knowledge and that the 
affiants are competent to testify to the matters stated in the 
affidavits. 
The Defendants7 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
The court finds that there are no genuine issues of material 
fact, and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. The court rules the reasoning of the majority in 
Pickup v. California Pacific Utilities 619 P.2d 325 (Utah 1980) 
to be persuasive in that the installation of the pipeline 
within the public easement is in keeping with the nature of the 
public use contemplated in the statutory creation of a public 
easement. Additionally, there is no claim or evidence that the 
presence of the pipeline here would constitute any additional 
detriment to or burden upon the Plaintiff, the owner of the 
underlying fee. 
DATED this day of April, 19*91. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Lewis Stevens 
Gayle F. McKeachnie 
